

As for Castro, his interviews with Jean Daniel, Foreign Editor of the French newspaper *L'Express*, who was acting as an informal intermediary for President Kennedy and was with Castro when Kennedy died, suggest that Castro hero-worshipped Kennedy in spite of the assassination plots, of which he was aware. Castro said, "At least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed," and "I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Referring to Kennedy's Cuban policy, Castro used words similar to those Oswald used in conversation with Marina the previous summer: "He inherited a difficult situation. I don't believe a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is... feeling the impact of this lack of freedom." (The Daniel articles appeared in *The New York Times*, November 27, 1963, and the *New Republic*, December 7 and 14, 1963.)

There is no evidence that Oswald ever felt much animus against Kennedy because of his Cuban policies or that such animus played any part in his decision to kill Kennedy. To the contrary, Oswald gave every appearance of having lost interest in Castro by November 1963, and to have shot Kennedy for totally different reasons.

35—The President's Visit

1. Conversation with Michael Paine, August 23, 1973.
 2. In his testimony before the Warren Commission in 1964, Hooty said that he was carrying twenty-five to forty cases in November 1963; but in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights in 1973, he said that he had been carrying forty to fifty cases.
 3. Testimony of Ruth Hyde Paine, Vol. 3, p. 100.
 4. Testimony of Ruth Hyde Paine, Vol. 2, pp. 515-516.
 5. Testimony of Mrs. Arthur Carl Johnson, Vol. 10, pp. 297-298.
 6. In the *Daily Texas* of May 13, 1964, the late Helen Yenne showed how, over a period of several days, news of the Barghoorn affair was printed in the Dallas papers near, or next to, stories about President Kennedy's visit. Characterizing Oswald as a "paranoid schizophrenic," Mrs. Yenne suggested that he may have hated Kennedy for "loving" Barghoorn in a way that he did not "love" him, and it was her view that the Barghoorn case could actually have triggered the assassination. So strikingly apt did Mrs. Yenne's analysis appear to the small circle of people who read her article and were also acquainted with Oswald that the weekend of November 16-17 was long afterwards known among them as "Lee's Barghoorn weekend." Mrs. Yenne, who was unaware that Oswald ever actually mentioned the Barghoorn case, was brilliant in spotting the significance of the affair.
- Publicity about Professor Barghoorn continued in newspapers, on radio, and on television through Wednesday, November 20, at which time the exact route of the Kennedy motorcade through Dallas was known. Some writers on the assassination have alleged with cruel inaccuracy that Barghoorn told Kennedy in the Oval Office following his release that he was a spy. Professor Barghoorn denies the allegation. Moreover, he never met President Kennedy and never saw him in the Oval Office—that week or any time. (Letter from Frederick C. Barghoorn to the author, August 11, 1976.)
7. Testimony of Ruth Hyde Paine, Vol. 3, pp. 43-44.

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advice that he go straight to the FBI. It did not, of course, incorporate the rest of her advice, that he tell them everything they wanted to know.

20. According to the Warren Commission Report, pp. 439-440, the FBI in Washington became aware of Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy on November 18 and routinely informed the Dallas office. Hosty learned of it only on the afternoon of November 22.
21. No one in the Dallas office of the FBI in November 1963 recalls on what day the note was delivered, although Mrs. Fenner's memory and other evidence suggest that it was delivered on the earliest possible date, November 12.

In his letter to the Soviet Embassy mailed that day, Oswald claimed that he had already made his protest to the FBI. This was false, for he knew of Hosty's second visit when he wrote the embassy and he only learned of that visit on Friday, November 8. Because of the long holiday weekend, Tuesday, November 12, was the first day Oswald could have left the note. He would have to have been severely upset to go to the FBI office at all. In fact, he picked a time when he could be almost certain that Hosty would be out. But when he was severely upset, he had a tendency to act quickly. All of this suggests that he delivered the note on November 12. The question has arisen whether he delivered it during the week of November 18, the week of the assassination itself. It is unlikely that Oswald would have called attention to himself by going to FBI headquarters with such a note at a time when he was thinking of killing the President. Thus Mrs. Fenner's recollection that the note was delivered ten days before the assassination in itself is evidence that Oswald was not yet considering the act.

Testifying before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights (*op. cit.*, pp. 35-39) on December 11, 1976, Mrs. Fenner created a considerable public stir by claiming that when Oswald tossed the note on her desk, it fell out of the envelope, and she read these words: "I will either blow up the Dallas Police Department or the F.B.I. office." The FBI was then severely blamed for having ignored Oswald as potentially violent.

James Hosty's description of the way the note was folded inward, with the writing inside, is in contradiction with Mrs. Fenner's description, and his account of the contents also is at variance with hers (*Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 129-130 and 145-147). It appears almost certain that Hosty's account is correct (interestingly, it matches that of Oswald) and that Oswald never made any threat of violence. If he had, Hosty would surely have tried to confirm the identity of the writer. But he has testified that he only became "100 percent certain" who the note was from on the afternoon of November 22 when Oswald, on meeting him in the county jail, became very upset and refused at first to speak to him (*Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 132 and 160).

22. On November 22, 1963, on his return from interviewing Oswald in the Dallas County Jail, Hosty was confronted at the FBI office by Special Agent in Charge J. Gordon Shanklin with the note which Oswald had left several days earlier. Shanklin, who appeared "agitated and upset," asked Hosty about the circumstances in which he had received the note and about his visits to Ruth Paine and Marina Oswald. On Shanklin's orders, Hosty dictated a two- to four-page memorandum setting forth all he knew and he gave the memorandum, in duplicate, to Shanklin.

Between two and four hours after Oswald's death on November 24, Shanklin summoned Hosty. Hosty recalls that Shanklin was standing in front of his desk and that he reached into a lower right-hand drawer and took out both the memorandum

and Oswald's note. "Oswald is dead now," he said. "There can be no trial. Here, get rid of this." Hosty started to tear up the documents in Shanklin's presence. "No," Shanklin shouted. "Get it out of here. I don't even want it in this office. Get rid of it." Hosty then took the note and memorandum out of Shanklin's office, tore them up, and flushed them down a toilet at the FBI. A few days later, Shanklin asked Hosty whether he had destroyed Oswald's note and the memorandum and Hosty assured him that he had. (Hosty's testimony appears in *Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 124-173, Shanklin's on pp. 39-129.)

Meanwhile, on November 23, Ruth Paine had given Hosty Oswald's handwritten draft of his November 9-11 letter to the Soviet Embassy (Oswald having left it on Ruth's desk when he left the house on November 12, as if he wished her to find it), and a day or so later she gave another FBI agent the copy she had made in her own hand on November 10. Hosty and the second agent, Bardwell Odum, told Shanklin about the letters and again, from his remarks, they thought he was ordering their destruction. The two agents concluded that Shanklin was on the edge of a nervous breakdown; instead of destroying Oswald's letter, they sent both copies to the FBI in Washington (Exhibit Nos. 15 and 103, Vol. 16, pp. 33-34 and 443-444).

Hosty's testimony makes it appear that his answers on an internal FBI questionnaire were subsequently falsified either by Shanklin or by someone in FBI headquarters in Washington to admit "poor investigative work" in the Oswald case. Hosty received letters of censure from J. Edgar Hoover, was placed on probation, was reprimanded for his Warren Commission testimony, and demoted to Kansas City. Years later, a promotion that was recommended for him was blocked by Clyde Tolson, chief deputy of J. Edgar Hoover. Except for Shanklin and two others, every FBI agent who had anything to do with the Oswald case in 1962 or 1963 was censured, transferred, demoted, or barred from promotion, while Shanklin received several letters of commendation from Hoover. The treatment of Hosty appears extraordinary, since it was he who saw that Oswald might warrant looking into and had recommended that the case be reopened in March 1963, after it had been closed for several months.

The statements of several witnesses before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights were at variance, particularly those of Hosty and Shanklin. Shanklin under oath denied that he had told Hosty to destroy the note and did not recall the rest of the incident as Hosty recounted it. Members of the subcommittee warned Shanklin, who is now retired, that he might be exposing himself to prosecution under federal perjury statutes. But prosecution has not been brought.

23. On April 19, 1963, President Kennedy delivered a speech on Cuba, and on April 22, Robert Kennedy made remarks in New York on Cuba which were reported in *The Millant*. Taken together, the remarks of the two men create a presumption that President Kennedy, and not just his brother, knew of plans physically to eliminate Castro. On September 9, while Oswald was still in New Orleans, the *Times-Picayune* displayed prominently an AP dispatch from Daniel Harter, in Havana, quoting Castro: "The leaders of the U.S. should think that if they are siding in terrorist plans to eliminate the Cuban leaders, they themselves cannot be safe." There has never been any indication that Oswald put two and two together in either April or September and realized that the United States government was engaged in actual assassination attempts against Castro.